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Abstract
Functionalism about kinds is still the dominant style of thought in the special sci-
ences, like economics, psychology, and biology. Generally construed, functionalism 
is the view that states or processes can be individuated based on what role they play 
rather than what they are constituted of or realized by. Recently, Weiskopf (2011a, 
2011b) has posited a reformulation of functionalism on the model-based approach 
to explanation. We refer to this reformulation as ‘new functionalism’. In this paper, 
we seek to defend new functionalism and to recast it in light of the concrete explana-
tory aims of the special sciences. In particular, we argue that the assessment of the 
explanatory legitimacy of a functional kind needs to take into account the explana-
tory purpose of the model in which the functional kind is employed. We aim at dem-
onstrating this by appealing to model-based explanations from the social and behav-
ioral sciences. Specifically, we focus on preferences and signals as functional kinds. 
Our argument is intended to have the double impact of deflecting criticisms against 
new functionalism from the perspective of mechanistic decomposition while also 
expanding the scope of new functionalism to encompass the social and behavioral 
sciences.
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1 Introduction
Whether functionalism offers a legitimate basis for providing explanations in the 
special sciences is an on-going debate in philosophy of science. The standard view 
of functionalism holds that some states and processes can be individuated based on 
what role they play rather than on what they are strictly constituted of.1 Function-
alists maintain that such functionally individuated states and processes can legiti-
mately figure into explanations in the special sciences.
While functionalism is still dominant in many domains of the biological, behav-
ioral, and psychological sciences, evolving debates in philosophy of science indi-
cate problems with traditional arguments in support of functionalism. On the one 
hand, early defenders of functionalism, like Fodor (1974), argued that the exist-
ence of well-supported laws involving functional kinds vindicates functionalism as 
an explanatory strategy. The main problem with this defense is that it has become 
doubtful whether there are any such laws in the special sciences (Cartwright, 1999; 
cf. Kincaid, 1996, 2004). On the other hand, recent growing support for mechanistic 
explanation in the special sciences suggests that functionalism’s emphasis on roles 
can be problematic if it prevents scientists from decomposing systems under inves-
tigation into mechanisms (Craver & Bechtel, 2006; Bechtel & Richardson, 2010). 
According to mechanists, it is through mechanistic decomposition that the special 
sciences ultimately achieve their explanatory aims. This leaves functionalism in a 
precarious position regarding whether and how functionally individuated states and 
processes can legitimately figure into explanations.
To address these concerns, Weiskopf (2011a, 2011b, 2017) has posited a refor-
mulation of functionalism on the model-based approach to explanation—we refer 
to this reformulation as new functionalism.2 Roughly, new functionalism holds that 
functionally individuated states and processes constitute kinds if they figure into a 
range of successful models instead of well-supported laws. Moreover, according to 
Weiskopf, functional kinds can be individuated via one of three different strategies: 
fictionalization, reification, or abstraction. Each of these strategies indicates why 
a particular functional kind is not amenable to mechanistic decomposition. Taken 
together, both of these elements are intended to show that functional kinds can serve 
as central explanatory units in the special sciences even if they are not amenable to 
mechanistic decomposition.
However, new functionalism has also received some critical reactions. In a recent 
iteration of the debate between functionalists and mechanists, Buckner (2015) intro-
duces a dilemma for Weiskopf’s account. Buckner argues that functional kinds are 
either still amenable to mechanistic decomposition (this holds for abstractions) or 
that the models involving functional kinds incur a loss of counterfactual power (this 
holds for fictions and reifications). He takes this dilemma to pose a serious challenge 
to new functionalism.
1 The term ‘individuation’ refers to the description by which states and processes are distinguished—it is 
what countenances their role in explaining a phenomenon.
2 We owe this term to Buckner (2015).
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In this paper, we aim at defending new functionalism by recasting it in light of 
the concrete explanatory aims of the special sciences, more broadly construed. We 
argue that the assessment of the explanatory legitimacy of functional kinds also 
needs to consider the purpose of the model in which a functional kind is employed. 
In this respect, we hold that Weiskopf’s account neglects the diversity of explana-
tory purposes found in the special sciences. However, and more importantly, we 
show that once these explanatory purposes are taken into account, the horns of 
Buckner’s dilemma will often turn out to be dull. We demonstrate this by appealing 
to model-based explanations from the social and behavioral sciences. Specifically, 
we make the case that preferences and signals—understood as functional kinds—are 
typically not affected by the dilemma given the explanatory purposes of the choice 
theoretic models in which they are employed. We take our argument to have the 
double impact of deflecting Buckner’s dilemma while also expanding the scope of 
new functionalism to encompass the social and behavioral sciences.
In what follows, section 2 situates Weiskopf’s new functionalism in contrast to 
traditional defenses of functionalism, and section 3 spells out Buckner’s mechanistic 
critique in response. Section 4 closely analyzes preferences and signals to highlight 
the shortcomings of both Weiskopf’s account and Buckner’s rejoinder. Section  5 
repackages new functionalism in light of our analysis and addresses the charge that 
our defense leads to parochialism or anything-goes pluralism. Section 6 concludes.
2  Functionalism in the special sciences
Fodor’s (1974, 1997) seminal argument for functional kinds relies on postulating the 
existence of law-like generalizations in the special sciences. The main target of his 
argument is physicalist reductionism, specifically the view that all special science 
laws are reducible to physical laws.3 He argues that a special science law  S1x →  S2x 
is reducible to a physical science law  P1x →  P2x iff there exist bridge laws connect-
ing special science predicates (that figure into a special science law) to physical 
predicates (that figure into a physical science law). Bridge Laws, e.g.,  S1x ↔  P1x, 
express contingent event identities stating that every event consisting of some x sat-
isfying S is identical with some event consisting of x satisfying P. They are contin-
gent in the sense that they cannot be established a priori. According to Fodor, what 
the reductionist needs to establish is that there are, in fact, bridge laws that connect 
each and every special science natural kind predicate with a physical science natural 
predicate. Here, natural kind predicates are those predicates that figure into the laws 
of (completed or ideal) science. Yet, Fodor argues that the natural kind predicates 
in a special science will most likely correspond to a heterogeneous disjunction of 
physical predicates that do not constitute natural kinds, i.e.  S1x ↔  P1x ∨  P2x ∨  P3x 
∨ … .  Pnx, where  P1x ∨  P2x ∨  P3x ∨ … .  Pnx is not a natural kind predicate. Hence, 
reductionism is unlikely to succeed.
3 Fodor clarifies that this version of reductionism is “a stronger one than many philosophers of science 
hold” (114, f.n. 2). Though, in his follow-up (1997) article, he attributes this view to Kim (1992).
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Yet, if the natural kind predicates of the special sciences correspond to a diverse 
set of physical predicates, how should we individuate them? Functionalists like 
Fodor argue that we can individuate special science predicates via the role they play. 
For example, in order for something to be money, it is important that it functions as 
a medium of exchange independent of what it is constituted of (gold, silver, copper, 
etc.). If this argument is correct, the special sciences are unlikely to reduce to phys-
ics. Therefore, they maintain autonomy with respect to their taxonomy.
To be clear, what’s important for Fodor’s argument is not just that some predi-
cates may not correspond to physical natural kind predicates, but more specifically, 
that the natural kind predicates of the special sciences do not correspond to physical 
natural kind predicates. If natural kind predicates are those predicates that figure 
into the laws of (completed or ideal) science, we need laws of special science in 
order to have special science natural kind predicates. However, according to some, 
there is an emerging consensus in the philosophy of science that the special sciences 
are not primarily in the business of discovering laws (Cartwright, 1999; cf. Kincaid, 
1996, 2004). Rather, they are in the business of devising and testing models which 
serve various explanatory functions with regard to their target phenomena. If this 
is the case, then it seems philosophers of science cannot secure the autonomy of 
the special sciences, and the legitimacy of using functionally individuated kinds in 
explanations by appealing (solely) to the existence of laws involving such kinds, for 
the simple reason that it is contested whether there are any such laws in the special 
sciences.4
There are, however, a growing number of alternatives to law-based defenses of 
functionalism in the special sciences. One alternative can be found in the work of 
Ross & Spurrett (2004, see also, Ladyman et al., 2007, Ladyman, 2008), which aims 
at exposing the limitations of reductionist approaches to causal explanation (i.e., 
Kim, 1992). In particular, they argue that non-reductionistic approaches to explana-
tion are better suited to identify and track properties and dispositions of macro-level 
entities given that these are primarily epistemic properties and not necessarily causal 
ones. Moreover, Ross (2005, 2006) has expanded on this idea, offering a compre-
hensive account of functionalism in the context of economics. This account builds 
on Dennett’s notions of intentional systems and ‘real patterns’ ontology (Dennett, 
1989, 1991). While we are sympathetic to the anti-reductionist stance of Ross and 
Spurrett, and find Ross’s intentional-stance functionalism to be a promising take for 
microeconomic research, we here would like to focus on a more general formulation 
of functionalism, one that offers a direct replacement to the law-based arguments of 
Fodor.
This brings us to the second alternative: the model-based approach to func-
tionalism. Weiskopf (2011a, 2011b) argues that legitimate functional kinds of 
the special sciences are those states or properties that feature in many coherently 
4 We do not take a stance on whether there are any special science laws as the answer to this question 
clearly depends on the particular notion of a law that one accepts. Though, we accept that, on some of 
the less demanding notions of laws, having a model that fulfills Weiskopf’s criteria outlined below may 
already suffice for having a law (cf. Kincaid, 2004).
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integrated and empirically successful models. In particular, he argues that a class 
of models needs to satisfy three conditions—these are:
1. The models need to be well confirmed. This implies that if there is a set of models 
that is, ceteris paribus, better supported by the available evidence, then this set 
is to be preferred and we should only consider the functional properties of these 
models to constitute natural kinds. (2011a, 336; 2011b, 252)
2. Models should be representationally accurate. That is, if there is a set of models 
that includes, ceteris paribus, more elements that are real parts of its targets or 
describes these elements in more (explanatory relevant) detail, we should only 
consider the functional properties of the more representationally accurate set of 
models to be natural kinds. (2011a, 336; cf. Gierre, 1988)
3. Models should be genuinely explanatory. This suggests that the set of models that 
can, ceteris paribus, answer more “what-if-things-had-been-different” questions 
is to be preferred and we should only consider the functional properties of these 
models to constitute natural kinds. (2011a, 320; 2011b, 250, 252)
Weiskopf also suggests that the models should be a good fit with our “general 
background knowledge” (2011a, 336). If we find a set of models that meets these 
criteria, he argues, we can take their functional categories (denoting the relevant 
states, processes, and properties) as providing legitimate explanations for the bio-
logical, behavioral, or psychological capacities under investigation.
But, for this argument to go through, we must accept two things: first, that 
when models explain, they explain in virtue of the functional categories, i.e., 
kinds, they posit; second, that what determines how functional kinds explain 
depends on how exactly they are supported by models, as opposed to laws. To 
this end, Weiskopf claims the following:
Much of the work of building theories, models, and simulations in the 
biological, behavioral, and psychological sciences involves finding the 
appropriate concepts to use in analyzing a system. On the view I propose, 
functional categories are kinds when they are appropriate and useful for 
constructing explanations of how a system comes to exercise particular psy-
chological and behavioral capacities. (2011b, 247)
The key shift in emphasis here is from requiring categories to play a role in law-
like empirical generalizations to requiring that they play a role in well-supported 
models. This shift in what constitutes a kind meshes particularly well with the 
recent emphasis on mechanistic and model-based explanation, as opposed to 
nomic or law-based explanation in the sciences (2011b, 251–52).
It seems clear, then, that the goal of new functionalism is to preserve the taxo-
nomic autonomy of the special sciences by stipulating the conditions under which 
functionally individuated states and processes can legitimately figure into expla-
nations. Though, it is somewhat ironic that Weiskopf emphasizes the alliance 
between mechanistic and model-based approaches in their break from nomic and 
law-based explanations for, as we show in the next section, it is the mechanist 
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who poses a real challenge to the explanatory legitimacy of functional kinds. 
Below we say a bit more about how Weiskopf envisions the individuation of 
functional kinds and present Buckner’s (2015) dilemma in response.
3  The mechanistic challenge to new functionalism
In contrast to the reductionists, whom Fodor argued against, recent challenges 
against functionalism have been raised by non-reductive mechanists. Proponents of 
causal-mechanistic approaches to explanation tend to agree that explanations need 
not be reductive to be legitimate (Machamer et al., 2000); moreover, they also tend 
to agree that the special sciences are not in the business of finding laws, and they 
accept that the main business of the special sciences is to construct models that aim 
at explaining their target phenomena. Yet, they argue that the way in which mod-
els in the special sciences achieve their explanatory aim is, ultimately, by offering 
mechanistic decompositions (Bechtel & Richardson, 2010). Mechanistic decompo-
sition enables special scientists to see how some target phenomenon can be decom-
posed into different parts and thus to see how these parts interact — i.e., how opera-
tions can be localized to working parts — in order to produce the capacities of the 
target that we are interested in.
But what is a mechanism? Glennan, for example, defines a mechanism as follows: 
“A mechanism for a behavior is a complex system that produces that behavior by the 
interaction of a number of parts, where the interactions between parts can be charac-
terized by direct, invariant, change-relating generalizations” (2002, S344). Similarly, 
Bechtel and Abrahamsen define mechanisms as structures producing their effects “in 
virtue of [their] component parts, component operations, and their organization. The 
orchestrated functioning of the mechanism is responsible for one or more phenom-
ena” (2005, 423).5
Building on such definitions, Craver (2006, 2007; Piccinini & Craver, 2011) sug-
gests that explanations employing functional kinds are explanatory only insofar as 
they provide mechanism sketches. Mechanism sketches provide incomplete albeit 
informative descriptions of how components and operations of a potential mecha-
nism are responsible for bringing about a certain phenomenon. To put this into per-
spective, proponents of the mechanistic approach to explanation might say that it is 
permissible to employ the functional kind neurotransmitter to describe what a par-
ticular molecule in the human brain does provided that neuroscientists have not yet 
been able to further specify the (relevant) parts of the mechanisms that involve the 
molecule. By further specifying what happens with(in) the molecule, i.e., localizing 
its operations to component parts, they can then begin to fill in the explanatory gaps 
and get a better understanding of why the system behaves in the way it does. Hence, 
according to what we here are calling arguments from mechanistic decomposition 
5 For a more comprehensive analysis of different accounts of mechanistic explanation in cognitive sci-
ence and the social and behavioral sciences, see Illari and Williamson (2012).
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(AMD), functionally individuated states and processes can only explain by virtue of 
offering mechanism sketches, otherwise they don’t explain at all.
In contrast to AMD, Weiskopf’s account (2011a, 2011b) elevates the status of 
certain functional properties above their role as mere mechanism sketches—it 
maintains that such functional kinds do not need to be decomposable or localiza-
ble to parts of an underlying mechanism or collection of mechanisms in order to be 
explanatory (e.g., such as when we localize what happens within a molecule that fits 
the functional description of being a neurotransmitter). More specifically, Weiskopf 
argues that many functionally individuated states and processes that figure into 
coherently integrated and empirically successful models do not lend themselves to 
mechanistic decomposition. This is meant to block AMD for those functional states 
and processes that qualify as legitimate under new functionalism.
3.1  Individuating functional kinds—three strategies
In contributing to the debate between new functionalism and the mechanistic 
approach to explanation, Buckner (2015) considers Weiskopf’s three strategies for 
individuating functional kinds.6 We briefly revisit each below:
Fictionalization is the process of “putting components into a model that are 
known not to correspond to any element of the modeled system, but which 
serve an essential role in getting the model to operate correctly” (Weiskopf, 
2011a, 331).
To demonstrate that functional kinds can be individuated via fictionalization, 
Weiskopf discusses the case of “fast enabling links” (FELs) in the brain. FELs are 
thought to play an essential role in neuroscientific models of vision by depicting the 
synchronization of distant neural regions in the brain. Weiskopf argues that although 
FELs possess “physically impossible characteristics” (331), they provide a descrip-
tion of the process by which the binding of intermediary visual representations takes 
place, a process critically involved in the categorization of spatial objects. Impor-
tant to this understanding of FELs as fictions is that they describe a process that is 
not carried out by any specific biological mechanisms currently known to neurosci-
ence. Yet, their explanatory force rests in the fact that they are not merely convenient 
labels for an unknown process but are a necessary part of models explaining certain 
aspects of visual processing.
Reification is the “act of positing something with the characteristics of a 
more or less stable and enduring object, where in fact no such thing exists” 
(Weiskopf, 2011a, 328).
Reification, like fictionalization, also involves positing descriptions of phenomena 
whose actual components or structures may be quite different from modeled sys-
tems (construed mechanistically). To illustrate this, Weiskopf turns to one of the 
6 Buckner refers to these individuation strategies as “etiologies” (2015, 3917).
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core concepts of cognitive science, representation. Understood as the vehicles of 
content for classical computational systems, representations exemplify the strategy 
of reification in that they are commonly posited as static and stable entities when, in 
fact, the process of representation depends upon multiple operations that are inextri-
cably linked at the level of neural realization, such as the dynamics of spike trains, 
excitatory and inhibitory potentials, and other electro-chemical events. So, like fic-
tionalization, reifications do not directly correspond to any known mechanistic com-
ponents of the system.7
Abstraction occurs “when we decompose a modeled system into subsystems 
and other components on the basis of what they do, rather than their corre-
spondence with organizations and groupings in the target system” (Weiskopf, 
2011a, 329).
Abstractions are perhaps the most common method of functional individuation — they 
decompose modeled systems on the basis of what they do, not on how they are actu-
ally structured. Simply put, the strategy of abstraction applies to any system that instan-
tiates functions, and hence functional kinds, that are not highly localized, but whose 
roles capture the essential operations of a system. Invariably, this involves discarding 
or ignoring details of the modeled system in favor of “coarse-grained” or “black-box” 
descriptions (2011b, 329). Weiskopf characterizes the power of functional abstrac-
tion by again appealing to the neural basis of object recognition in vision, suggesting 
that the act of parsing neural processing into “layer-like” stages helps vision scientists 
gain epistemic traction on processes whose actual organizing structures possess greater 
internal organization which may not be directly relevant to the primary function of 
interest. However, unlike fictionalization and reification, a description is deemed func-
tionally abstract when it describes subcapacities that the depicted systems really pos-
sess (meaning that nothing new is being posited—they are literal subcapacities of the 
system). Moreover, these subcapacities are (in principle) implemented, or implementa-
ble, by different parts of the system depicted, but cannot possibly, or can only with dif-
ficulty, be localized to particular parts of an underlying mechanism.
In response, Bucker argues that none of these three strategies can ensure the 
explanatory legitimacy of functional kinds. In rebutting the method of fictionalization, 
Buckner argues that because cases of fictionalization run the risk of losing counter-
factual power, this method of individuation is not a viable justification for functional 
kinds. In particular, his claim is that although fictionalization might help us to account 
for certain aspects of a phenomenon, it does so “at the cost of a diminished ability to 
predict and explain another—namely, the aspect that is fictionalized” (2015, 3927). 
In other words, the counterfactuals implied by the fictionalized components are likely 
to be false. Bucker takes this to be a good reason to think that the kinds picked out by 
fictionalization do not meet the normative constraints of good explanation.
7 But unlike fictionalization, reification makes use of our knowledge of the organization of the underly-
ing components (those that can be known). It is these components that determine the characteristics of 
the functional capacity being reified. This is what distinguishes FELs from neural representations. In 
light of this, it might be interesting to ask whether this distinction can be understood in purely epistemic 
terms.
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In rebutting the method of reification, Buckner distinguishes two forms of reifica-
tion, which he terms “fissional” and “fusional” reification (2015, 3929–3232). As the 
names suggest, fissional and fusional reification refer, respectively, to cases in which 
functional kinds are individuated via partitioning component operations (fission) or 
via aggregating component operations (fusion). In fissional reification, two or more 
distinct components are introduced whose causal capacities are actually possessed 
by the same underlying part of the system (or the system as a whole), whereas in 
fusional reification, one introduces a component whose causal capacities are actually 
distributed amongst distinct parts of the system. Buckner surmises that attributing 
kindhood to neural representations is an act of fissional reification since neural rep-
resentations do not refer to discrete components of a discrete mechanism but instead 
depict a process by which encoded information enables perceptual inference. Against 
fissional reification, he invokes what he calls the “A without B” challenge. In brief, 
the challenge is as follows: “for any two subcapacities A and B, if the system can-
not perform A without engaging the very same mechanism that performs B, then an 
explanation that construes A and B as distinct subcapacities will have less counter-
factual power than an otherwise identical model that depicts them as two aspects of 
the same capacity” (2015, 3929). Hence, fissional reifications, like fictions, are not 
explanatory because they lead to losses in counterfactual power. He likewise suggests 
that similar concerns about counterfactual power can be put forward against fusional 
reifications (though, he also suggests that fusional reification, if it doesn’t suffer from 
counterfactual power, ought to be seen as just another form of abstraction).
Finally, in addressing abstractions, Buckner considers separate reasons why one 
might appeal to the explanatoriness of abstractions. The first consideration is a meta-
physical concern that functional kinds are, or seem to be, unlocalizable in principle. 
This consideration is often paired with arguments suggesting that functional abstrac-
tions are serviceable for the purposes of dealing with emergent properties and events 
which are ontologically irreducible to base components. Buckner’s reaction to this 
consideration is surprisingly simple: there’s little reason to think that functional 
kinds in cognitive science are, in principle, ‘metaphysically’ complex and thereby 
resistant to mechanistic decomposition. This is because, once we rid ourselves of 
models that involve fictions and reifications, as he argues we ought to do, there’s no 
reason to think that anything complex remains.
The second consideration is that, even if functional kinds, construed as abstrac-
tions, are localizable in principle, they nevertheless have unique epistemic utility. 
This consideration is often paired with arguments suggesting that the complexity 
of certain systems may render attempts at decomposition too costly. In this regard, 
Buckner argues that whereas fictionalization and reification both involve unfortunate 
tradeoffs in counterfactual power, abstraction could count as a legitimate reason to 
posit functional kinds. However, to be legitimate, the abstraction must be interpreted 
as a sketch that could be elaborated into a more complete mechanistic model. In 
other words, abstraction, unlike fictionalization and reification, only counts as legiti-
mate when it is known to pick out underlying mechanisms. Hence, Bucker affirms 
the view that functional models are ultimately just mechanism sketches. We can thus 
distill Buckner’s worries about new functionalism to the following:
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Buckner’s dilemma. Special science models that employ functional kinds either 
suffer from a loss of counterfactual power (as compared to mechanistic explana-
tions), or they must be interpreted as mechanism sketches that should ideally be 
elaborated into full mechanistic explanations.8
3.2  Deflecting Buckner’s dilemma
Buckner’s analysis raises a number of important issues for Weiskopf’s account, 
many of which we find compelling, e.g., we agree that functional kinds—understood 
as fictions and/or reifications—can, in some contexts, lead to considerable losses 
in counterfactual power; moreover, we agree that functional kinds—understood as 
abstractions—can aid in mechanism discovery (for further clarification on the heu-
ristic value of mechanism sketches, see, e.g., Craver, 2006; Piccinini & Craver, 
2011). Yet, we find two short-comings with Buckner’s argument:
First, Buckner’s criticisms of functional kinds are limited to models in biology 
and cognitive science. They are, therefore, far from grounding the general skepticism 
about functional kinds that he takes them to establish. This motivates our turn to func-
tional kinds that are employed in models in the social and behavioral sciences.9 Sec-
ond, Buckner’s dilemma presumes that model-based functionalism needs to block or 
avoid AMD otherwise functional kinds fail to be explanatory. However, this charge 
overlooks the fact that functional kinds can be employed for explanatory purposes for 
which offering mechanism sketches seems inappropriate. That is to say, even if indi-
viduation by fictionalization or reification leads to losses in counterfactual power and 
individuation by abstraction suggests that mechanistic decomposition is possible, this 
doesn’t entail that models which employ functional kinds don’t satisfy “norms of good 
explanation” (Buckner, 2015, 3922). As we will now argue, this is because functional 
kinds may be invoked for many different explanatory purposes—these different pur-
poses are, so far, not taken seriously by either Buckner or Weiskopf.
In the next section, we present and defend two examples from the social and 
behavioral sciences which reveal that models involving functional kinds aim at a 
diverse set of explanatory purposes. Not only do we take this to present a challenge 
to Buckner’s dilemma, but we also note that, for each purpose, the associated kind’s 
9 To be fair to Buckner, we recognize that Weiskopf’s original defense of model-based functionalism 
was primarily aimed at promoting functional explanations in the cognitive sciences, not necessarily the 
social and behavioral sciences. It is thus an open question whether Buckner’s dilemma applies differently 
across disciplinary boundaries. For now, we simply wish to point out that, in light of certain explana-
tory purposes in the social and behavioral sciences—which we discuss in section 4 and 5—Buckner’s 
dilemma can be deflected. While we remain optimistic that this can also be done for different explanatory 
purposes in the cognitive sciences, further investigation is required.
8 To be clear, Buckner’s dilemma is meant to apply at the level of individual functional states or pro-
cesses and not at the level of the model itself. For instance, a model could posit multiple functionally 
individuated states and processes (e.g., abstractions and fictions) and so could in principle be plagued 
by both horns of the dilemma simultaneously. In such cases, the strategy for deflecting the dilemma — 
which we propose in section  4— will need to be investigated for each of those states and processes. 
While it is, of course, an interesting question how we should proceed if deflecting the dilemma only 
works for some (but not all) posited functional kinds, we ultimately think this needs to be considered on 
a case-by-case basis.
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explanatory role is determined independently of how it can be individuated accord-
ing to any of Weiskopf’s three individuation strategies. For reasons discussed in sec-
tion 5, we think this points to an improvement for model-based functionalism.
4  Unlocalizable functional entities in the social and behavioral 
sciences
To motivate the importance of a model’s purpose for assessing the explanatory legiti-
macy of particular functional kinds, this section examines the use of preferences and 
signals in the social and behavioral sciences. We suggest that each are candidate func-
tional kinds. Moreover, we illustrate the explanatory purposes of the models in which 
these functional kinds are frequently employed (this is a descriptive claim). We then 
show that different instances of signals and preferences are amenable to different pars-
ings according to Weiskopf’s taxonomy. Finally, we show how being employed in the 
context of the explanatory purposes of their models allows these functional kinds to 
evade both horns of Buckner’s dilemma. That is, they evade the dilemma independently 
of whether we understand them as abstractions, reifications, or fictions.
4.1  The case of preferences
One class of explanatory projects that seems to be predestined for involving func-
tional kinds are those which aim at comparing various heterogeneous systems or 
studying the interplay of those systems. We take the application of choice theory to 
the behavior of various entities, e.g., firms, households, humans, and animals, to be 
a prime example of this. Preferences are a fundamental concept in choice theoretic 
disciplines like microeconomics and game theory. In this regard, preferences are fre-
quently employed for the purpose of explaining via uncovering the same patterns 
across mechanistically heterogeneous systems. In this subsection we will argue that 
this can allow them to evade Buckner’s dilemma.
4.1.1  How do preferences explain?
Let us illustrate preferences in more detail. While economics is very explicit about the 
structural assumptions that preferences are supposed to satisfy, there is virtually no 
explicit definition of the concept in economic textbooks. Nevertheless, substantial views 
about what preferences in economics are meant to refer to usually identify them as func-
tional kinds. This holds true for most prominent accounts of preferences, of which there 
are basically three. Mentalists (Dietrich & List, 2016; Okasha, 2016) hold that we should 
view preferences as referring to mental states. As such, proponents of mentalism typically 
defend functionalism about mental states, often in opposition to reductive, neurocentric 
interpretations of mental states. In contrast, the most common non-mentalistic position 
is behaviorism (Gul & Pesendorfer, 2008). Behaviorism is sometimes characterized as 
holding that preferences in economics are merely short-hand descriptions for summariz-
ing patterns in choice behavior (Clarke, 2016). In other words, preferences are just the 
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choices that agents make. Yet, even in this case, what counts as a choice is arguably indi-
viduated on functional grounds (Clarke, 2020). There are also more subtle positions that 
sometimes get classified as behavioristic. For instance, Ross has argued for interpreting 
preferences as “real patterns” (Ross, 2005, 2006). Following Dennett, he makes the case 
that those patterns have a special ontological status in virtue of how we attribute beliefs 
and intentions to the agents who exhibit them. Like mentalism, this view also resists 
reductive interpretations of preferences; but unlike mentalism, it takes preferences to be 
contingent upon the actual behavioral profile of agents, which is bound by various socio-
logical and institutional constraints. Finally, dispositionalism (Guala, 2019) maintains that 
preferences are more adequately viewed as multiply realizable and information-dependent 
choice-dispositions. What is important for dispositionalism is that the causal base of a 
preference can be realized in multiple and diverse ways, i.e., different sets of causal prop-
erties can give rise to the same set of choice-dispositions (cf. Prior et al., 1982). Hence, 
entities with quite different causal properties can all exhibit the same preferences. So, 
under dispositionalism, preferences are also functionally individuated entities.10
One might then ask, why are preferences in choice theory typically viewed as func-
tionally individuated entities? First, choice theoretic models involving preferences are 
used to describe the behaviors of very different entities (Herfeld, 2018; Guala, 2019). 
For instance, there are choice theoretic models of firms and households (Mas-Colell 
et  al., 1995), mice (Holm et  al., 2007), and even hermit crabs (Elwood & Appel, 
2009). To give a simple example, two firms can share the same demand curve for cop-
per even though the mechanisms in virtue of which they make their decisions differ 
substantially. Similarly, if food options require work to be obtained, preferences can 
also enable us to compare the demand curves of two different species of animals for 
those food options (cf. Elwood & Appel, 2009; Holm et al., 2007).
What is more, not only do choice theoretic models allow us to spot commonali-
ties between different entities, but they also enable us to explain what would result 
from the interaction of those entities. Just consider that various types of households 
regularly interact with various types of firms in basic economic models (Mas-Colell 
et al., 1995). One could, of course, try to explain the interaction of these different 
systems by decomposing the mechanism by which they make their decisions and 
interact. However, this would likely involve the study of quite heterogeneous mecha-
nisms, invoking multiple scientific disciplines. It would, thereby, miss that the inter-
action of quite dissimilar entities is often driven by the same or similar principles, 
such as information asymmetries or loss aversion (Herfeld, 2018; Guala, 2019).
To give a concrete but simple example of how economists explain with prefer-
ences, consider the prisoner’s dilemma. In this game, when both players decide to 
cooperate (c), they both receive the reward R for cooperating. If they both decide 
to defect (d), they both receive punishment P. If one of them cooperates, while the 
other one defects, the cooperator receives the sucker payoff S and the defector the 
10 Even though there are important on-going debates about the proper interpretation of preferences—
see, e.g., Dowding (2002), Camerer (2008), Hausman (2008, 2012), Guala (2012), Thoma (2020), Vre-
denburgh (2020), and Clarke (2020)—we bracket these debates for the sake of space. What is important 
for us is that preferences in choice theory are broadly and uncontroversially construed as functionally 
individuated entities.
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temptation payoff T. Each of the two players prefers T > R > P > S (see Table 1 for an 
illustration of the prisoner’s dilemma).
With the help of this information, we can already offer an explanation for why both 
agents will play ‘defect’. Each of the agent’s prefers T > R. Consequently, if they believed 
that the other player would play ‘cooperate’, they would play defect. Similarly, both play-
ers prefer P > S. Hence, if they believed that the other player would play ‘defect’, they 
would play ‘defect’. So, independently of what they believe the other player will do, they 
will always choose to defect. In a prisoner’s dilemma, we can simply refer to an agent’s 
preference structure to explain why both agents will choose to defect.
What is important to note about this explanation is that it does not matter how 
exactly the agent’s preferences are constituted, e.g., what their causal base is. That’s 
not to say that the actual implementation of the agent’s preference structure doesn’t 
depend on facts about the causal composition of their base or realizer; rather, we 
don’t need to know what comprises them in order to explain why the players choose 
to defect (when they do). The ‘why’ question being answered here concerns a 
behavioral-level phenomenon, on which one can provide explanations for the behav-
ior of humans as well as non-human agents. Moreover, many of the entities to which 
economists apply choice theoretic models will likely turn out to make their choices 
in virtue of quite different mechanisms. Consequently, modeling them with the help 
of the toolbox of preferences (and beliefs) allows one to spot and explain patterns 
that would have otherwise been likely missed. For this reason, we take the use of 
preferences in choice theory to indicate a class of explanatory purposes that can 
be facilitated by involving functional kinds in one’s models but are unlikely to be 
accomplished by purely mechanistic models: Functional kinds enable comparisons 
between mechanistically heterogeneous systems and help to account for the interac-
tion of such systems.11
Table 1  The prisoner’s dilemma
P1 denotes player 1, P2 denotes player 2, c and d stand for the 
actions the players can perform. The table denotes the outcomes that 





11 To be clear, what we say here about rational choice models involving preferences is not new. For example, 
Ross (2005, 2014; see also Ross & Spurrett, 2004) argues that non-reductive preference-based models in 
economics and social science can and do provide rich causal explanations using modeling tools like utility 
functions, budget constraints, and relative prices. These causal explanations are not amenable to mechanistic 
decomposition (in Buckner’s sense of the term) precisely because they emerge from real behavioral patterns. 
While we are sympathetic to Ross’ argument, our aim here is slightly more general. In particular, we think 
that one can endorse the view that functional kinds enable comparisons between mechanistically heterogene-
ous systems without assenting to the view that preferences are real patterns. Moreover, our aim in defending 
model-based functionalism is meant to go beyond the example of preferences discussed here.
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4.1.2  Individuating preferences
From the perspective of the debate between Weiskopf and Buckner, it would seem natural 
to ask how, exactly, preferences are to be individuated in order to assess whether we 
should really grant them the explanatory power that choice theorists take them to have. For 
Weiskopf, this matters because defending the legitimacy of functional kinds against the 
mechanist depends on their being countenanced by one of his three individuation strategies. 
Whereas, for Buckner, this matters because the efficacy of his dilemma depends on 
showing that each individuation strategy fails to justify functional kinds figuring in special 
science explanations. The issue we want to raise here is that it often has no bearing on the 
explanatory power of preferences which of the three strategies one happens to accept.
Preferences‑as‑abstractions Preferences could be thought of as abstractions if it 
turns out that one and the same mechanism is always responsible for a certain choice, 
e.g., a over b. If it would be the case that every time the agent is presented with a 
choice between two options, a and b, the same causal pathway would lead the agent 
to choose a, then the preference ‘a over b’ would be an abstraction insofar as it 
provides a “coarse-grained” or “black-boxed” description of the relevant mechanisms. 
Following Bucker’s line of argument, preferences construed as abstractions could only 
be seen as legitimately explanatory in cases where they provide mechanism sketches 
that could (and ideally should) be elaborated into more complete mechanistic models.
However, we take it that this judgment cannot be easily maintained once we take 
into account the concrete explanatory purposes in which preferences are usually 
involved. In following Guala (2019), we have to distinguish between explaining pref-
erences and explaining with preferences. In the former case, one tries to explain the 
details why a particular agent has the preferences she exhibits. This explanatory pro-
ject could, for instance, be pursued by decomposing a preference that counts as an 
abstraction into the individual parts that comprise the underlying mechanisms (this 
is one of the goals of neuroeconomics—Camerer et al., 2005). Yet, when it comes 
to explaining with preferences, economists are usually not interested in explaining 
why a particular agent has the particular preferences she has; instead, they are inter-
ested in, among other things, modeling the interaction of different types of agents 
in a common framework and/or explaining why the same behavioral patterns are 
found across a range of different types of agent. For instance, Herfeld (2018) out-
lines how Aklerlof’s (1970) market-for-lemons model allows us to see that informa-
tion asymmetries can account for the same behavioral patterns occurring across a 
wide range of settings involving agents that differ significantly when it comes to the 
mechanisms by which they make their choices (e.g., agents in the used-car market in 
Zurich and those that buy second-hand goods in the Ecuadorian rainforest).
Given that explaining preferences and explaining with preferences are different 
explanatory projects, the claim that preferences, as abstractions, are just mechanism 
sketches misses the mark. There are two reasons for this. First, providing additional 
details on the causal compositions of an agent’s preferences does not necessarily 
improve the explanation we are pursuing when explaining with preferences. For 
instance, if we already know how an agent will behave in a prisoner’s dilemma-
type situation given their preferences, information about the neural basis of those 
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preferences will not have added value for the relevant explanation. Second, mechanistic 
decomposition may even threaten to complicate achieving the aim we are after when 
explaining with preferences. This is because we risk losing the abilities to facilitate 
comparisons between mechanistically heterogeneous systems and to account for the 
interaction of such systems. For example, explaining the interaction of the agents in 
the prisoner’s dilemma purely in mechanistic terms may require gathering a lot of 
details about the potentially different causal compositions of the agents’ preferences.12 
If doing all this work does not improve the explanation we already get from knowing 
their preference orderings, mechanistic decomposition becomes a futile task. Hence, 
claiming that preferences are mechanism sketches that should be expanded upon 
seems highly misleading. Consequently, the horn of Buckner’s dilemma that applies to 
abstractions turns out to be quite dull if we consider preferences in the context of the 
explanatory purposes of the models in which they are employed.
Preferences‑as‑reifications and preferences‑as‑fictions On the one hand, it is plausible 
to view some preferences as reifications. This can, for instance, be the case when it 
turns out that it is not always the same mechanism, or mechanisms, responsible for a 
choice between two options. For example, imagine that an agent in the morning could 
choose ‘coffee over tea’ because she needs the caffeine kick to start her work. However, 
the same choice between tea and coffee in the afternoon may be influenced by the fact 
that the agent desires the taste of coffee more than that of tea while having a break. 
For many explanatory projects in choice theory and microeconomics, all that matters 
is that the agent has a stable preference for coffee over tea; it matters little that different 
mechanisms are at work in realizing the same preference in dissimilar contexts.
On the other hand, certain preferences must be construed as fictions. For instance, 
consider the assumption of continuous preferences that is frequently employed in 
economic models. The assumption states that whenever an agent prefers A to B to 
C, there is a probability p such that the agent is indifferent between p*A+(1-p)*C 
and B. Roughly, this assumption can be understood as agents having infinitely fine-
grained preferences. For example, not only do agents like 2 apples more than 1, if 
they have continuous preferences over apples, they also prefer having 33.33333333% 
of an apple over 33.33333332% of the same apple. As a result of this, some prefer-
ences that certain models ascribe to the agents might be too fine grained to be psy-
chologically plausible. Yet, continuity often facilitates the derivation of the results 
of a certain model (cf. Reiss, 2012). Hence, economists frequently put components 
into their models that are known not to correspond to any element of the modeled 
system but are nevertheless important for the model to function.
This brings us to the horn of Buckner’s dilemma dealing with reifications and fic-
tions. Could he still claim that if preferences are construed as reifications or fictions, 
12 As we mentioned already, arguing that preferences are merely mechanism sketches overlooks the fact 
that preferences can be multiply realized. For this reason, we are very sympathetic to Ross (2014, 218-
28) who criticizes the neuroeconomics program defended by Camerer et al. (2005), known as “behav-
ioral economics in the scanner”, which attempts to reduce agents’ preferences to neural processes and 
mechanisms. This program epitomizes the kinds of reductive approaches to explaining preferences that 
we here are trying to avoid by emphasizing that some explanatory purposes call for explaining with pref-
erences.
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they fail to explain? Let us first consider reifications. As with representations in cog-
nitive science, it is plausible to expect that some preferences and beliefs in choice 
theory will turn out to be fissional reifications. Buckner’s main worry here is that 
fissional reifications involve a loss of counterfactual power as the causal capacities 
attributed to beliefs and preferences, respectively, are actually possessed by the same 
underlying component of the system in question (recall the “A without B” chal-
lenge). Hence, construing preferences as distinct entities can lead to false counter-
factual statements—that is, it can lead us to make false statements about what will 
happen when we change an agent’s beliefs because we mistakenly assume that this 
can be done while holding her preferences constant.
However, what becomes relevant once we take the explanatory purposes for 
which preferences are usually employed into account, is whether this particular loss 
of counterfactual power matters in the context of those purposes. For instance, it 
is not that clear that by assigning a particular set of preferences to an agent (e.g., 
T > R > P > S) we also make claims about the plasticity of those preferences. That 
is, while choice theoretic models can explain by showing how particular patterns 
in behavior result from different types of agents having certain preferences in often 
highly different circumstances, it is far from obvious that they, thereby, are also 
meant to serve the purpose of informing us about what would happen if an agent’s 
beliefs or preferences were changed (cf. Clarke, 2020). Hence, the loss of coun-
terfactual power that comes with reification may not affect many of the models in 
which preferences are frequently employed given their explanatory purpose.
Finally let us consider fictions. Above we said that at least some preferences, viz. 
those that seem to be too fine-grained to be psychologically plausible and applicable 
to ordinary choice behavior, are fictions. Could Buckner at least maintain that pref-
erences, construed in this way, are problematic even if we account for the explana-
tory purposes for which they are employed? The short answer is no. While some 
preferences are clearly fictions, e.g., those that we assign on the basis of continuity 
assumptions, we rarely find choice theoretic models in which all preferences are fic-
tions. Moreover, even if preferences are introduced as fictions, this is typically for 
the purposes of mathematical convenience. This is not to say that idealizations, such 
as assuming continuity, always yield explanatory power in choice theoretic models. 
It is just to say that the fictions that we introduce as a result of those idealizations 
do not introduce additional worries beyond those about idealizations that one may 
already have (cf. Reiss, 2012; Hausman, 2013). Whether we accept the resulting loss 
of counterfactual power as a price for the mathematical convenience that is gained 
by introducing preferences as fictions into our models, and how this tradeoff bears 
on the explanatoriness of the relevant model, is a question that needs to be assessed 
on a case-by-case basis. Importantly, for the debate at hand, this means that we 
cannot simply undermine the legitimacy of particular choice theoretic models by 
pointing out that some of the preferences they assume agents to have are ultimately 
fictions.
All in all, it seems that regardless of whether preferences are construed as abstrac-
tions, reifications, or fictions, neither of the horns of Buckner’s Dilemma seem to 
affect them in the context of the explanatory purpose of many choice theoretic mod-
els in which they are employed. We take the upshot of all of this to be that many 
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special science models that aim at showing commonalities between mechanistically 
heterogeneous entities—and which try to explain the interaction of those entities 
based on such commonalities—stand to incur great benefits and no harmful side-
effects from employing functional kinds in their models.
4.2  The case of signals
Often functional kinds are also involved in models whose explanatory purposes are 
intricately linked to the presence of functional kinds—this is because the properties 
that make these models explanatory in the light of the model’s purpose would disap-
pear at the mechanistic level. This can be true even for cases where decomposition 
is quite easy and also for those cases where we are not interested in detecting pat-
terns across different systems or studying their interaction. To illustrate this kind of 
explanatory project, we consider the case of signals in the Lewis-Skyrms approach 
to the study of meaning. This approach investigates how meaning emerges and how 
different signals acquire their meaning. It thereby relies heavily on game-theoretic 
models (see, e.g., Lewis, 1969, Skyrms, 2010). Central to this approach is the notion 
of signaling games. A signaling game is a coordination game in which one agent 
(the sender) sends a signal to another agent (the receiver), who then performs an 
action depending on the signal. A signal can be anything that serves the function of 
inciting a certain response in the receiver. In a signaling game, agents try to realize 
mutual benefit. In order to realize this benefit, the receiver has to perform the correct 
action, whereby the correctness of an action depends on the state of the world which 
only the sender can observe. The main idea behind the Lewis-Skyrms approach is 
that the meaning of a signal is constituted by the function the signal plays in a sign-
aling system (see, e.g., Lewis, 1969; Godfrey-Smith, 2017; Harms, 2004). Hence, 
we take this approach to be a promising case study in the context of model-based 
functionalism.
4.2.1  How do signals explain?
Before we will illustrate how the Lewis-Skyrms approach explains meaning, we 
will briefly expand on some of the details of the approach. A signaling system con-
sists of a set of contingency plans, i.e., the contingency plans of the sender(s) and 
receiver(s). The contingency plan of the sender(s) is a mapping from states of the 
world to signals. The contingency plan of the receiver is a mapping from signals to 
actions. In this regard, we can think of contingency plans as behavioral dispositions 
of the sender and the receiver.
Following Lewis (1969), we only speak of a signaling system if the contingency 
plans of the speaker and the receiver combine in such a way that they constitute 
a coordination equilibrium in a coordination game. More precisely, if contingency 
plans are plans of actions over all possible situations—i.e., what game theorists refer 
to as strategies—they constitute a Nash equilibrium iff no agent could do strictly 
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better by changing her contingency plans unilaterally. A coordination equilibrium is 
a Nash equilibrium in which every player prefers that everyone else conforms to a 
set of contingency plans if at least all but one conforms.
For these reasons, according to the Lewis-Skyrms approach, the meaning which 
the signal is carrying, i.e., what kind of signal it is, is determined by its functional 
properties. More precisely, it is determined by the role it plays in the signaling sys-
tem. Accordingly, explaining meaning requires us to look at signals at the functional 
level (see Table 2 for an illustration of two signaling systems).
To illustrate how this approach intends to explain meaning, consider one of 
Lewis’ (1969) favorite examples. Lewis envisioned a signaling game in which two 
agents have to exchange messages about the onslaught of the British on the conti-
nental army. The Sexton of the old new church (the sender) has knowledge about 
the British, and Paul Revere (the receiver) is in a position to warn the continental 
army. Both aim at giving the correct warning to the continental army, i.e., they give 
no warning if the British stay at home, they give warning that the British are com-
ing by sea if the British are coming by sea, and so on. Yet, the Sexton is only able to 
signal the state of the world to Paul Revere by hanging lanterns into the window of 
the church. Hence, they aim at matching their respective contingency plans in such a 
way that they always reach the best possible outcome. For example, the Sexton can 
choose to hang no lantern in the window if the British are staying at home, one lan-
tern if they are coming by land, and so on. Paul Revere can choose to give no warn-
ing if there is no lantern, warn that they are coming by sea if there is one lantern, 
and so on. Now imagine that Paul and the Sexton have to repeatedly engage in the 
described situation. Once the actual contingency plans of both agents match in such 
a way that they form a signaling system (i.e., that they will always give the correct 
warning), the resulting conventional solution to the coordination problem constitutes 
the meaning of the signal. In other words, the meaning of the signals (the lanterns 
in the window) are constituted by their role in such signaling systems. A real-world 
case that is similar to Lewis’ example can be found in the system of warning cries 
of Campbell’s monkeys, who give an alarm cry when they spot a predator (Zollman, 
2011). According to the Lewis-Skyrms model, the meaning of these warning cries is 
determined by the function they play in the monkey’s warning system (see Table 3 
for an illustration of Lewis’ lantern game).
Table 2  Two signaling systems
Two signaling systems in a signaling game where successful coordi-
nation depends on action A1 being performed if S1 is the state of the 
world and A2 being performed if S2 is the case. Signals SigA and 
SigB play different roles in each system. Hence, their meaning dif-
fers between the systems (cf. Zollman, 2011, 161)
Sender Receiver
S1  ⇒   SigA SigA  ⇒  A1
S2  ⇒   SigB SigB  ⇒  A2
S2  ⇒   SigA SigA  ⇒  A2
S1  ⇒   SigB SigB  ⇒  A1
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Many of Lewis’ successors argued for different equilibrium concepts that can 
underlie a signaling system and investigated the conditions under which such sys-
tems exhibit certain stability properties (see, e.g., Sugden, 2004). Moreover, oth-
ers (most notably Skyrms, 2010) have shown how various selection processes—
like biological evolution, reinforcement learning, imitation of success, and rational 
choice—can shape agents’ contingency plans in such a way that they can consti-
tute a signaling system. Despite all of this, the main message of the Lewis-Skyrms 
approach to the study of meaning is that meaning is explained by a signal’s func-
tion in a signaling system. We take this to indicate a second class of explanatory 
purposes for models involving functional kinds: Functional kinds enable the track-
ing of phenomena that aren’t visible at the level of the components of the relevant 
mechanisms.13
4.2.2  Individuating signals
Let’s again consider what Weiskopf’s individuation strategies can tell us about sig-
nals. We take it that one can view signals as either abstractions or reifications.14
Signals‑as‑abstractions To return to Lewis’ example, we could interpret signals as 
abstractions of the lantern mechanism. For instance, the signal that the British are 
coming by sea, could be broken down into the Sexton’s act of putting two lanterns 
into the window and Paul receiving a certain visual input, which, in turn, leads him 
to send a certain warning (e.g., the British are coming by sea). We can interpret 
this whole process as a signal. This would offer a very coarse-grained description 
of the relevant mechanisms. Moreover, the whole process is only individuated as a 
Table 3  Lewis’ lantern game
C1, C2, C3 … denote the contingency plans of Paul. L1, L2, L3 … 
denote the contingency plans of the sexton. Players get payoffs 1/1 if 
their contingency plans form a signaling system; 0,5/0,5 if their con-
tingency plans match such that they lead sometimes to the correct 
outcome; 0/0 if they never lead to the correct outcome (see Lewis, 
1969, 124)
C1 C2 C3 …
L1 1/1 0/ 0 0,5/0,5 …
L2 0/ 0 1/1 0,5/0,5 …
L3 0,5/0,5 0,5/0,5 1/1 …
⁝ ⁝ ⁝ ⁝
13 Unlike preferences, the case of signals demonstrates that functional kinds do more than facilitate 
cross-system comparisons and explain interactions; it indicates how functional kinds can provide knowl-
edge and understanding of patterns which cannot be tracked, and therefore not explained, via mecha-
nistic decomposition—this holds even for individual systems. However, we think this doesn’t rule out 
that mechanistic intervention through decomposition can help to explain other aspects of the system, for 
example, when the systems in question break down or fail to function. But this would complement, not 
replace, either of the here mentioned explanatory purposes.
14 It seems unlikely that signals could be construed as fictions, so we don’t consider this strategy.
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signal because of its function. Understood like this, signals seem to fit the notion of 
abstraction that Buckner and Weiskopf rely upon.
How would Bruckner’s dilemma affect this interpretation? It seems obvious that 
arguing that signals, as abstractions, would still be amenable to mechanistic decom-
position would not undermine their explanatory legitimacy in the context of the 
Lewis-Skyrms approach. The reason is simply that decomposing the relevant signals 
would lead us away from the functional level at which meaning is ultimately to be 
explained. Once we have specified the role of a signal in a signaling system, further 
details about the underlying mechanisms can do little to explain the signal’s mean-
ing. Hence, we hold that signals as abstractions do not succumb to the charge of 
being mere mechanism sketches.
Signals‑as‑reifications Consider that it may not only be necessary that Paul receives 
a certain visual input in order for him to send a certain warning, but it may also 
be required that Paul classifies this input the right way. If Paul would suffer from 
occasional hallucinations that lead him to see additional spots of light in the church 
window, the signals in Lewis’s example could not function in the relevant signaling 
system as they are intended to do. Hence, in order for the relevant signals to occupy 
their specific role in the signaling system, it seems to be important that Paul’s brain 
mechanisms responsible for classifying visual inputs work in a certain (perceptually 
correct) way. Therefore, it could also be argued that the signals in Lewis’s example 
are reifications that fuse the lantern mechanisms with Paul’s brain mechanisms.
How then would the horn of the dilemma that is supposed to apply to reifications 
affect signals under the Lewis-Skyrms approach? As illustrated above, according to 
the Lewis-Skyrms approach, meaning is located at the functional level of signaling 
systems. Any attempt to decompose the signal into its constituent parts would, there-
fore, be unable to explain why a particular signal has its particular meaning. In other 
words, under the Lewis-Skyrms approach, functional kinds located at the level of 
signaling systems are indispensable when it comes to the explanations of meaning. 
Hence, no matter what general explanatory drawback we identify for reifications—
such as losses in counterfactual power—these drawbacks in and of themselves can-
not undermine the legitimacy of using signals as functional kinds for explaining 
meaning because, within the Lewis-Skyrms framework, the meanings that signals 
encode can only be explained at the functional level.
Given all of this, we hold that arguing about whether the signal is an abstraction, 
or a reification, would not be very illuminating with respect to the explanatory role 
that signals play within the Lewis-Skyrms approach because the phenomenon those 
models intend to account for is simply not visible at the level of the components of 
the relevant mechanisms. In cases like this, Buckner’s dilemma cannot undermine 
the explanatory legitimacy of the relevant functional kinds.
Against this, however, one might argue that relying on the Lewis-Skyrms 
approach in the context of new functionalism is misguided as it does not attempt to 
give a causal explanation, but rather tries to explain in what meaning is grounded, 
i.e., the role of a signal in a signaling system. More generally, one could hold that 
new functionalism should be restricted to causal explanations. If this were correct, 
it would undermine our signal example and we would instead have to identify an 
1 3
European Journal for Philosophy of Science          (2021) 11:103  Page 21 of 28   103 
attempt at giving a causal explanation where mechanistic decomposition would 
make the phenomena to be explained vanish.
First, we hold that new functionalism should not be restricted in this way. Second, 
there are also causal explanations that help us to make our case. To see this, just 
consider that the Sexton in Lewis’ example could use different types of ‘lanterns’ 
to communicate, e.g., he could use flaming torches or kerosine lamps. Now con-
sider that Paul sees the lights that were produced by the kerosine lamps. Should we 
say that his warnings were caused by the specific light-emitting technology, or say 
that it was caused by seeing a specific number of lights in the church window? It 
seems that only the latter statement would be explanatory in this particular context, 
while the first statement would threaten to obscure the behavioral pattern exhibited 
by Paul (see also, List & Menzies, 2009). Consequently, we take the Lewis-Skyrms 
approach to be a straightforward example of a model-based research program involv-
ing functional kinds that are unaffected by Buckner’s dilemma. Moreover, the worry 
that the phenomena to be explained will not be visible at the level of the components 
of mechanisms seems to generalize to models whose purpose it is to offer causal 
explanations.
5  New functionalism, restated
Given the considerations of the previous section, we can now see that the explana-
tory purposes in which functional kinds are involved cross-cuts the ways in which 
they are, or could be, individuated. In some cases, knowing how a functional kind 
fits into Weiskopf’s taxonomy may not even be necessary to defend its legitimacy 
against Buckner’s dilemma once we take its explanatory purposes into account.
This indicates to us that an assessment of the model-based approach to functional 
explanation requires more than an account of how functional kinds are individu-
ated—it needs to also recognize that models utilizing functional kinds often serve 
quite different explanatory purposes. In particular, we focused on functional kinds 
that (a) enable comparisons between mechanistically heterogeneous systems and 
help to account for the interaction of such systems, and those that (b) enable the 
tracking of phenomena that aren’t visible at the level of the components of the rel-
evant mechanisms. In such cases, one cannot simply ask how a particular model 
involving functional kinds would compare with some mechanistic explanations; one 
has to ask how it serves the particular explanatory purpose of the model in which it 
is employed. To put it differently, the legitimacy of a particular functional kind does 
not only depend on how it is individuated, but also on the explanatory purposes in 
which the models that employ those functional kinds are involved.
The aim of this final section is to outline how our arguments offer a defense of 
new functionalism. First, we characterize our arguments in terms of a reformulation 
of Weiskopf’s original conditions for model-based functional explanations. More 
specifically, we suggest that his third condition, the genuine explanatoriness condi-
tion, needs to be broadened if we want to evade Buckner’s dilemma. Second, we 
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argue that broadening this condition does not lead to parochialism or anything-goes 
pluralism.
5.1  Genuine explanatoriness does not depend only on counterfactual power
We have illustrated different classes of explanatory purposes for which functional 
kinds may be legitimately employed. How does this relate back to Weiskopf’s origi-
nal vision regarding model-based functionalism? Recall that according to his formu-
lation, explanations employing functional kinds have to be (i) well-confirmed, (ii) 
representationally accurate, and (iii) genuinely explanatory. Nothing in our discus-
sion above shows (i) and (ii) to be problematic.
However, if we take a closer look at how Weiskopf spells out genuine explan-
atoriness, some may worry that our cases above do not exemplify this condition. 
Recall that Weiskopf states that condition (iii) entails that a set of models that can, 
ceteris paribus, answer more ‘what-if-things-had-been-different’ questions is to be 
preferred, and further, that we should only consider the functional properties of 
these models to constitute kinds. For example, one might now be tempted to think 
that models containing preferences are unable to answer ‘what-if-things-had-been-
different’ questions about the source and structure of those preferences. This, we 
agree, may happen if one takes preferences to be reifications or fictions.15 Similarly, 
one may think that signaling models do not lend themselves to making counter-
factual statements about how changing the realizers may affect the meaning of the 
signals and hence the behavior of the senders/receivers. However, as we have also 
suggested, this should not be a major worry as demanding that the relevant models 
answer those kinds of questions would amount to neglecting their specific explana-
tory purposes.
This brings us back to the second horn of Buckner’s dilemma—namely, that 
models that do not answer as many counterfactual questions as possible fail to be 
explanatory. The argumentative thrust of this horn comes from the presumption that, 
ideally, the relevant model should provide as many counterfactual statements about 
its target as possible—this means that, given two competing models, the one which 
can provide more answers to counterfactual questions about the target phenomena is 
the better model. In this regard, Buckner states that:
We also must be told why the functionalist interpretation of [their] models is 
to be preferred over mechanistic alternatives. The common currency in arbi-
trating between functionalist and mechanistic interpretations, I have supposed, 
is counterfactual power, with the interpretation that supports more genuine 
counterfactuals being preferable, ceteris paribus. (2015, 3928)
15 To be clear, this worry really only applies to non-behavioristic interpretations of preferences (e.g., 
Dietrich & List, 2016; Guala, 2019). But for behavioristic interpretations, there should be no worry 
about the counterfactual power because nothing is being reified or fictionalized--a preference just is a 
choice. So, we can ask and answer ‘what-if-things-had-been-different’ questions about preferences 
understood as choice-behavior (e.g., asking how a change in price will affect a change in choice).
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However, our discussion suggests that it should not primarily matter how many 
counterfactual statements the models in which functional kinds are employed can 
support, but whether they support the kind of counterfactual statements that are rel-
evant for the explanatory purpose of the model. Everything else would amount to 
comparing apples with oranges. Consequently, while we do not think that Buckner’s 
dilemma is the devastating objection to new functionalism that he takes it to be, it is 
nonetheless a very useful device for pointing out weaknesses in Weiskopf’s specific 
construal of new functionalism.
We, therefore, hold that genuine explanatoriness does not imply giving as many 
counterfactual statements as possible; it means answering as many questions as 
possible that are relevant to the purpose of the model—this may of course include 
answering some ‘what-if things-has-been-different’ questions. Hence, we suggest 
that condition (iii) should be construed as a purpose-adequacy condition, meaning 
that a model’s explanatory power should be examined and judged in terms of the 
model’s contribution to answering questions relevant to its explanatory purpose.
5.2  Explanatory monism, pluralism, and holism
We suggested that Weiskopf’s condition (iii) for model-based functionalism should 
be amended so as to allow for different explanatory purposes. As will become clear 
below, we hold that this adjustment is necessary to account for the trade-off in 
explanatory purposes one can pursue with any given model. However, our amend-
ment may raise the concern that we are defending a form of ‘anything-goes’ plural-
ism about scientific explanation. Buckner (2015) argues that appealing to various 
explanatory purposes, as we have, can lead to a form of model parochialism. The 
worry is that appealing to various different purposes allows one to evade answering 
questions about counterfactual power by restricting the aims of the model in an ad 
hoc manner. Yet, we will now make the case that this worry is exaggerated.
Let us, therefore, briefly expand on the two most common normative positions 
one can take with respect to the explanatory aims of science. One can be monist and 
hold that there is one central, context-independent aim in science and only models 
that satisfy this aim are legitimately explanatory. We take it that many mechanists 
are, at least implicitly, monists. However, as our discussion so far has indicated, we 
reject this position. By contrast, one can be pluralist and hold that there are various 
purposes a model can pursue to be legitimately explanatory. Most often for the plu-
ralist, pragmatic considerations determine which models are explanatory in a given 
context (see e.g., Potochnik, 2017). This view is usually rejected by mechanists, like 
Buckner, as they worry that it makes it too easy for scientists to insulate their models 
from critique by redefining their explanatory purposes in an ad-hoc manner.
We take the functional kinds and models discussed in section 4 to already sug-
gest that appealing to different explanatory purposes is, by far, not always an ad 
hoc move. In fact, by looking at the wider modeling literature it is easy to see that 
model building is context-sensitive in the sense that modelers construct their mod-
els with specific purposes in mind. That is, models are never meant to be the kind 
of universal purpose tools that monists might take them to be. In this regard, Mäki 
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(2009) argues that models are usually accompanied by a commentary that identifies 
the specific purposes of the model. This stands in stark contrast to Buckner’s view 
that appealing to the aims of a model to defend the inclusion of functional kinds is 
usually an ad hoc defense. Mäki demonstrates this by appealing to the commentary 
that accompanies the famous Schelling model (Schelling, 1971), saying it “explic-
itly states that the rationale of his models is not the ambitious one of serving as 
first approximations that can be elaborated to simulate with higher fidelity the real 
situations we want to examine” (2009, 38). In other words, the model does not aim 
at offering a mechanism sketch. In a similar vein, Potochnik (2017, 67) notes with 
respect to game theoretic models that study the emergence of cooperation in evo-
lutionary biology (e.g., Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981), that it is clear that “their aim 
is to depict patterns in how natural selection can, in general, causally contribute to 
the emergence of cooperation. Because these models of cooperation ignore so many 
other causal influences in order to focus on the role of natural selection, they have a 
limited range of application and limited accuracy of most any evolved trait.” In both 
of these examples, the commentary accompanying the models clarifies the purpose 
and scope of the model. In neither case can this additional information be construed 
as an ad hoc defense of the model’s explanatory limits—it is, rather, a specification 
about how to understand the aims of the model. Consequently, the wider modelling 
literature suggests that pluralism should be preferred to monism and that pluralism 
does not need to give way to the ad hoc defenses that Buckner is worried about.
Nevertheless, this may not address the issue of parochialism fully as one can 
still disagree with the guiding motivations which set a particular modeling agenda. 
In other words, one may simply be unconvinced that a given explanatory purpose 
that can be used to legitimize functional kinds is itself legitimate. This raises the 
worry that, if we are correct in our argument so far, the debate about new functional-
ism is potentially deadlocked due to contrasting commitments about the legitimate 
aims of science. Consequently, one may worry that our attempt to deflect Buckner’s 
dilemma has not gotten us very far because one could simply respond by insisting 
on the illegitimacy of explanatory purposes that would allow us to legitimize func-
tional kinds. Even though we cannot fully address this here, we briefly respond to 
this worry in two ways.
Our first response is that we take the burden of proof to lie with mechanists. This 
is because they need to argue that explanatory purposes that are commonly pursued 
in the special sciences are, in fact, illegitimate. However, we anticipate that this 
will not be enough to persuade the mechanists. Our second response is, therefore, 
to point at a potential way out of this deadlock. This is the view from explanatory 
holism, which is advantageous to different scientific aims but also blocks anything-
goes pluralism or parochialism.
According to Hochstein (2017), explanatory pluralism does not offer a viable 
alternative to monism because both positions treat the assessment of explanatory 
legitimacy of models in the abstract—that is, independently of other models with 
which they may be informed and interconnected. He takes this to be a crucial flaw 
for both monism and pluralism. On the one hand, he agrees with the wider modeling 
literature that individual scientific models cannot simultaneously satisfy all the sci-
entific goals typically associated with explanation—that is, “a given model’s ability 
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to satisfy some goals must always come at the expense of satisfying others” (2017, 
1105). On the other hand, any model that sacrifices some explanatory goals to attain 
others will always “necessarily undermine its own explanatory power in the pro-
cess” from the perspective of the monist. Hochstein’s response is that, in assessing 
the legitimacy of a model’s purposes, we must appeal to collections of models and 
assess how much attaining the explanatory purposes of one model can help us to 
satisfy other explanatory purposes.
Taking inspiration from Hochstein, we now propose that one way to break the 
deadlock and to block the charge of parochialism is to ask in how far the explana-
tory purposes we pursue with any given class of models are able to support other 
explanatory purposes pursued by other classes of models. In asking this question, 
we are committed to the view that the special sciences are ultimately a cooperative 
endeavor. Consequently, we take the perspective that a model’s explanatory purpose 
should be evaluated also on the basis of how well it contributes to the broader net-
work of explanatory aims. That is, of course, not to say that any individual model 
actually has to pursue all of these aims. We agree with Hochstein, and the wider 
modelling literature, that it cannot. Instead, the relevant issue is whether achiev-
ing one explanatory goal can also help us to achieve others. Asking this question 
introduces a criterion for demarcating explanatory purposes—in particular, it allows 
us to distinguish purposes which support merely parochial projects from purposes 
which also contribute to other explanatory aims. For instance, one way to defend the 
explanatory purposes of, say, Akerlof’s market-for-lemons model, against the charge 
of parochialism would be to show that having knowledge of the general patterns that 
arise in markets due to information asymmetries makes it easier to search for the 
particular mechanism that give rise to this pattern in a particular instance (cf. Her-
feld, 2018). Consequently, we view explanatory holism as offering a promising way 
out of this deadlock.
Of course, one may retort that we fall short of showing that the explanatory pur-
poses we have pointed out here always or necessarily contribute to some broader 
network of explanatory aims. Moreover, it remains an open question whether all 
legitime explanatory purposes contribute to such a network. These two issues relate 
to a broader concern regarding our appeal to holism, which is that it allows for the 
possibility that models involving functional kinds will remain explanatorily incom-
plete unless properly integrated into a larger model-network, which presumably also 
includes mechanistic models.
On the one hand, this would grant the mechanist room to argue that mechanistic 
explanations are still required at some level. In this regard, we agree that it is an 
important question how networks of models can and should come together to pro-
vide holistic explanations. We suspect that there is not one type of holistic explana-
tion, but various types, whose compositions may depend on different, local sociolog-
ical factors. But how to identify these types is a question for another paper. Whether 
each and every holistic explanation requires mechanistic models is, therefore, an 
open question. In any case, our argument here suggests that some explanatory pur-
poses can only be achieved by invoking functional kinds (which are not amenable to 
mechanistic decomposition).
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On the other hand, one could argue that if genuine explanations are only offered 
by networks of models, this would undermine the explanatory purposes mentioned 
above. In other words, one could hold that only holistic explanations should count 
as genuine (i.e., capital ‘E’) explanations. However, while one may hold this view, 
it would not change any of the substantial points we made in this paper. That is, our 
strategy for deflecting Buckner’s dilemma would not be affected by it.16 In any case, 
for now, our aim was just to point out that holism provides one promising strategy 
for getting out of the deadlock and blocking the charge of parochialism.
6  Conclusion
Our aim in this paper has been (a) to demonstrate that there are diverse explana-
tory aims in the social and behavioral sciences, and (b) that we can appeal to these 
aims in a non-ad hoc manner which indicates the limitations of Buckner’s dilemma 
for criticizing new functionalism. To this end, we have defended an approach to 
model-based explanation by proposing a reformulation of Weiskopf’s conditions 
under which functional kinds legitimately explain. We have pointed out that simply 
disagreeing with the legitimacy of the purposes we introduced would be a potential 
way to reassert the validity of Buckner’s critique; and, that the resulting disagree-
ment about normative commitments concerning the explanatory aims of science 
could lead to a deadlock. To demonstrate that there is a way out of this deadlock, 
we sketched how holism can provide us with the basis for demarcating explanatory 
aims.
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